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1 Introduction
For several reasons the process of decentralizing decisionmaking in
the public sector has received much increased attention during the
past decade: In some Western countries a reasessment of the existing
system of fiscal relations among the different levels of government
was demanded by certain regions (e.g. Canada, Germany), in the
member countries of the European Union the debate intensified with
regard to the functions the European Union should perform, in
transition countries the breakup of centralized decisionmaking
forced to establish new systems of fiscal federalism and in several
developing countries fiscal federalism was discussed in particular
with regard to its compatibility with macroecoonomic stabilization
(e.g. Argentina, Brazil, India). However, despite this intense debate
“systematic evidence on the contribution of fiscal decentralization to
economic performance is scarce” (Oates, 1995, p. 352).
This paper attempts to contribute to this empirical research by
looking at the experience of Western European countries where a
wide variety of the degree of fiscal decentralization can be found.
However, in an attempt to increase the robustness of the findings a
sample of 17 Western European countries is enlarged by several
other high income countries and several developing countries whose
land size is relatively large.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief
overview on the main theoretical arguments for and against fiscal
decentralization. Section 3 outlines the growth framework used in
this study and the applied estimation strategy. Section 4 presents and
discusses the estimation results and section 5 concludes.5
2  The case for and shortcomings of fiscal
decentralization
Fiscal decentralization in this paper characterizes the (legal) power
of subnational governments to raise tax revenues and decide on
spending programs on their own will within legal criteria. It should
be noted that there is no formalized theory of the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. This may
reflect a basic conflict inherent in fiscal decentralization.
2.1 The case for fiscal decentralization
2.1.1 “Diversification hypothesis”
The “diversification hypothesis” (or “decentralization theorem”)
maintains that uniform levels of public goods and services across
jurisdictions will generally be inefficient (Oates, 1972, 1977). The
model that yields this result is based on two main observations:
consumers’ demand (preferences) for a given public good/service
differ and public goods and services have different spatial
characteristics, i.e. some benefit the whole country whereas others
benefit only regions or local communities. It is assumed that
- a single public service is being offered,
- there are only two communities each of which has a different
demand for the service,
- individuals are immobile,
- there are no economies of scale from centralized provision of the
public service and
- there are no spill-over effects in the provision of the service from
one community to the other.
In this model a uniform level of public services offered in each
community is inefficient because in both communities due to the
different demand schedules marginal benefits and marginal costs of
the public service differ. Ressources can be saved without making
somebody worse off by diversifying government outputs in
accordance with local demands. Hence, Pareto efficiency can be
raised through fiscal decentralization. In this model, the larger the6
variance in people’s demands for public goods the larger the benefits
of decentralization tend to be. In other words, local government
outputs need to be differentiated according to local tastes and
circumstances but this requires discretion of local governments over
spending programs, i.e. fiscal decentralization.
Introducing mobility of people into the Oates model causes
incentives for individuals to move to that community that offers the
best perceived combination of supply of the public service and local
tax rate. Individuals would “vote with their feet” to join that
community that offers them a preferred mix of taxes and public
services. By so doing individuals contribute to efficient resource
allocation. This is also the main thrust of the famous Tiebout (1956)
model.
Besides increased efficiency through fiscal decentralization, the
Oates model with mobility and the Tiebout model predict
segregation of communities by income: assuming a positive income
elasticity of the demands for local public services, the community
with the higher per capita income will offer a higher level of public
output per capita, all other things held equal. Given the larger tax
base in this community, financing this relatively large level of per
capita public output may not require a relatively high local tax rate.
Hence, residents from the relatively poor community may wish to
move to the relatively wealthy community in order to benefit from
both the larger level of public output and larger tax base. Without a
mechanism to prevent this, the model outcome is thus unstable. A
stabilizing meachnism can be that high income communities
employ, for instance, zoning regulations (such as prohibition of
apartment buildings etc.) to fend off low income households. A
tendency towards a system of relatively income-segregated
communities results, who have specific preferences for public goods
and services. Empirical studies for US-American cities confirm this
stratification (e.g. Borjas, 1995) which is also visible at least in the
large cities of most other countries.
The important point is that the outcome of this segregation of
households by income class is efficient resource allocation in the
local public sector. This finding has, however, serious qualifications:7
First, the assumption of no spillover effects among communities (i.e.
consumption of the public good is restricted to the individual
community) is extremely restrictive. In the strict sense almost any
local expenditure is associated with externalities even if there would
be no mobility. For instance, local investment in health and
education can be expected to result in more productive labor which
promotes local economic growth and thus causes spillover effects.
Moreover, if externalities increase over time, for instance due to
technical progress, the case for decentralization may be weakened.
Second, the model outcome of local differences in per capita
quantity and quality of public goods/services will be in conflict with
norms of social equity. This objection and the first one could,
however, be alleviated through introducing transfers from the central
government to subnational governments and prescribed minimum
standards for the public goods
2. Ideally, the transfer system should
not cause new inefficiencies. Third, factors such as commuting costs
and limited employment opportunities suggest that the model may
better be applicable in a metropolitan context than in a regional one.
Fourth, economies of scale in the production of public goods and
services weaken the case for decentralization.
These qualifications show that there is a basic contradiction inherent
in  fiscal decentralization: Fiscal decentralization necessitates central
government transfers and other measures of central government
intervention to reduce inequities and other problems but this
intervention erodes fiscal decentralization (Prud’homme, 1994,
1995).
Oates (1993) argued that the thrust of the basic case for fiscal
decentralization (greater allocative efficiency) should also apply to a
dynamic framework of economic growth. It could be expected that
centrally determined policies consider regional and local conditions
in the provision of public goods and services less well than locally
determined policies, for instance regarding infrastructure and
education. Economic development and growth may therefore be
promoted if local authorities have a say in such policy decisions.
                                                          
2 It may be possible to interpret the setting of norms of social equity as an explicit
recognition of spillover effects (positive externalities) of certain public goods. Then
the first and second qualification would not be different from each other.8
2.1.2 “Leviathan restraint hypothesis”
Fiscal decentralization may act as a constraint on the behavior of
revenue-maximizing governments (Brennan/Buchanan, 1980). To
the extent that governments behave as revenue-maximizers,
horizontal and vertical competition among different levels of
government may contribute to containing the size of their budgets
and thus restrain the overall size of the public sector. Fiscal
decentralization may thus prevent an oversupply of public goods and
services and/or x-inefficiency in the public sector.
2.1.3 “Productivity enhancement hypothesis”
Fiscal decentralization implies a transfer of responsibility associated
with accountibility to subnational governments. This may provide
incentives for subnational governments to not only consider local
preferences of residents (as in the Oates model) but to search for
innovations in the production and supply of public goods and
services. Production costs and prices of public goods and services
could thus be lower and their quality better than in a uniform
approach to providing public goods and services. In addition, fiscal
decentralization relieves the central government from many tasks.
Thus, the latter may be able to better concentrate on efficient
production of those public goods and services for whom it still bears
responsibility (ideally goods and services with large spillovers
among communities and/or substantial economies of scale in
production).
2.1.4 Political arguments
Increasingly the economics literature acknowledges democracy as a
factor of importance for long term economic growth. Political
integration of minority groups, competition of governments,
containment of vested interests, well defined property rights,
transparancy in public transactions all tend to promote the
development of markets and may better be guaranteed by a
democratic than by an autocratic system.
For transition countries it has been shown that economic reform and
democracy (proxied by the civil liberties index constructed by9
Freedomhouse) are highly positively correlated (EBRD, 1999, p.
113). An empirical analysis of the political economy of reform in
these countries does not support the traditional view that
concentration of political power, limited political competition and
even rapid implementation of reforms enhances the prospects for
succesful and sustained economic reforms (EBRD 1999, chapter 5).
This analysis argues that political competition and less
concentration of political power promote economic reform by
weakening the influence of vested interests on public policy.
These experiences demonstrate that a political strategy for economic
growth should not be based on a simple model of a strong central
government that may impose changes. Rather it may be
hypothesized that fiscal decentralization strengthens democracy and
contributes to economic growth: its political power diluting effect
may weaken the power of interest groups; it promotes competition
among subnational governments; it may have superior information
channels because governments are closer to people; the closeness
may also facilitate effective control of local governments; the ability
of a country to produce ideas for innovations and implement them in
the production of public goods and services may increase; ethnic and
other minorities may not feel excluded from political power
(especially in the local or regional context) which may reduce
tensions in countries with regional ethnic diversities and thus
stimulate  economic activity.
2.2 Shortcomings of fiscal decentralization
The basic conflict inherent in fiscal decentralization is that it
produces some clearcut failures which require central government
intervention. The latter, in turn, erodes fiscal autonomy,
responsibility and accountability of subnational governments. The
theoretical case for fiscal decentralization is further weakened by
problems of practical implementation.10
2.2.1 Variance of incomes among households and regions produces
inequities under fiscal decentralization
The Oates model showed that fiscal decentralization breeds social
inequity: incomes and tax bases are unevenly distributed among
jurisdictions and regions. Wealthier communities and regions are
attempting to fend off low income households. Thus, there needs to
be a centralized redistribution policy.
2.2.2 Macroeconomic stabilization
In order for a country to be able to smooth macroeconomic
fluctuations it is necessary to at least reserve the option to intervene
without a considerable time lag on a macroeconomic scale,
especially through fiscal policy. However, for subnational
governments there may be little incentives and/or possibilities to act
countercyclically in a coordinated fashion and symmetrically with
respect to recessions and booms
3. Also, fiscal decentralization may
change the income elasticities of revenues of the different
government levels such that stabilization becomes more difficult. (If,
for instance, the relatively income elastic and productive income tax
and VAT revenues accrue to subnational governments, then the
stabilization task for the central government may become more
difficult). Hence, macroeconomic stabilization under fiscal
decentralization may be inhibited because spending and revenue
decisions of lower levels of government do not conform with
stabilization goals.
As stressed by Tanzi (1995) the stabilization task in many countries
(especially transition countries) refers not only to countercyclical
goals but especially to fiscal adjustment needed to eliminate
structural (chronic) fiscal imbalances. But structural imbalances may
be worsened by fiscal decentralization: One example for this is when
a government level grants a tax exemption regarding a tax whose
                                                          
3 It is generally agreed that the power of subnational governments to borrow should be
strictly limited and that bail-outs of subnational governments by the central
government should be prevented. Thus, the ability of subnational governments to
pursue expansionary policy is limited.11
revenue is largely received by other levels of government. Thus, tax
sharing arrangements may cause perverse incentives.
Fiscal decentralization may contribute to predatory and
unpredictable taxation (such as in Russia, see Zhuravskaya, 1999)
which promotes shadow economic activity. Also effective and
timely coordination among the different government levels may be
difficult to implement, thus hindering stabilization.
2.2.3 Quality of governments and of local democracy
If on the central government level there is a lack of quality for
whatever reason (e.g. lack of knowledge, corruption) that causes
inefficiencies then decentralization could, in principle, be a remedy.
However, it appears inconsistent to assume that local governments
would be less affected by these problems. On the contrary, it may be
argued that in general central governments achieve a higher quality
level. They may attract the more qualified people because of better
career opportunities and salaries (Prud’homme, 1994). In addition,
local democracies may offer less effective control of elected officials
than occurs at the central level, because officials at the local level
are closer to people and therefore possibly more susceptible to
personalism. If the quality of government declines with the level of
government then decentralization could increase inefficiencies. If
the quality at all government levels is very high, decentralization
may not be needed, because the central government level may be
able to collect and process quickly all information necessary to
achieve those efficient outcomes that are expected from
decentralization.
2.2.4 Low per capita income level
Decentralization implies fixed costs to run the subnational
administrations and control them. In low income countries these
fixed costs may consume a share of the total funds administered by
subnational governments that is considered too large to justify
decentralization (Prud’homme 1995). The contention that there
appears to be some positive correlation between the income level
and fiscal decentralization has also been made by Bahl and Linn
(1992, p. 391-393): “Decentralization more likely comes with the12
achievement of a higher stage of economic development”. The
authors argue that there is a relatively high treshold level of
economic development at which fiscal decentralization becomes
attractive. Such a threshold level can be explained not only with
fixed costs of decentralization but with the fact that at a relatively
low per capita income level, the demands for public goods and
services may be concentrated on very few goods and have a small
variance. Thus, at a low income level it may not be difficult for a
central government to have all information necessary to make the
right decisions on local public goods production. With a rising
income level or starting at a certain minimum income level, the
demands for public goods and services increase and so does their
variance, i.e. preferences of people become more heterogeneous.
Hence, economic gains from diversification of outputs in local
jurisdictions emerge and thus possibly from fiscal decentralization.
2.2.5 Small size of the country
If a country and/or its population is relatively small, the individual
views may be relatively homogeneous. Hence, differences in
individual preferences for public goods and servcies may not be
pronounced thus reducing the potential gains from decentralization.
In addition, the fixed costs implied by decentralization may not
warrant the effort to decentralize.
2.2.6 Scarcity of good local taxes
It is clear that decentralization requires own revenue sources for
subnational governments. From the perspective of the expected
benefits arising from competition and accountability of subnational
governments these revenue sources should be determined by
subnational governments. From the perspective of securing a “good”
tax system that provides for equity, little distortions, low
administrative costs, income elastic revenues etc. the revenue
sources should be determined at the national level. As a compromise
the traditional Musgrave (1959) view is still widely shared. This
view holds that of the three main functions of a government (i.e.
allocation, redistribution and stabilization) only the allocation13
function may be shared by different levels of government; its
financing should rely, to the extent possible, on the benefits-received
principle in order to preserve fairness and economic efficiency.
However, taxes, fees and surcharges that satisfy the benefits-
received principle are relatively scarce, in general they do not yield
sufficient revenue and their administration can be costly and difficult
(Mc Lure, 1995; Tanzi 1995). Hence, revenue sharing is
indispensable in financing subnational governments but this reduces
the latter’s fiscal autonomy, responsibility and accountability and
has the mentioned drawbacks for stabilization.
2.2.7 Low degree of urbanization
The local governments of rural areas are faced with a little
diversified tax base and democratic control may function less well
there (Prud’homme, 1994). Hence, a rising degree of urbanization
may facilitate decentralization and vice versa.
2.2.8 Scarcity of goods and services that are truly “public”
The idea of efficiency gains through fiscal decentralization is based
on the assumption that a government needs to supply goods and
services which are “public” (nonexcludable, nonrival). However,
there are few goods and services that qualify for the strict definition
of being public. In addition, their composition is subject to changes.
Technical progress appears, on the one hand, to contribute to
reducing the number of true public goods, for instance by facilitating
excludibility in the use of public services such as roads. On the other
hand, it needs to be recognized that technical progress may also
contribute to increasing demand for public goods and services such
as noise and pollution control and police protection (for instance in
the internet). However, basic education and health care, waste
disposal services, utilities, security, prisons etc. all could and
sometimes are supplied by private companies. The activity of these
private companies could be subject to governmental supervision to
maintain minimum quality standards. Hence the question arises
whether instead of decentralization a superior form of improving
efficiency in supplying these goods and services could be simply to
encourage their private supply. Equity aspects and positive14
externalities could be considered by introducing vouchers, issued by
the central government to consumers, that allow a minimum
consumption per capita at no direct cost to the consumer (McLure,
1995). Consumers would use the vouchers for their basic needs and
thus decide directly and not via the local democracy on the types and
quality of services they want to consume. Equity and regional
equalization aspects could be very well considered in this approach,
especially when it would be combined with means testing.
However, there are also be drawbacks of this suggestion: it is the
central government that would have to decide on the goods and
services that can be obtained with the vouchers. But the central
government is farther away from consumers than local governments.
Misuse of the vouchers and difficulties with means testing are
additional problems.
To sum up, important determinants of fiscal decentralization are
4:
·  The quality of central and of local government
(The lower the quality on either level, the less attractive fiscal
decentralization may be);
·  The quality of local democracy;
·  Income differentials between households and regions
(The larger they are the more important becomes redistributional
policy that can be implemented effectively only by the central
government making fiscal decentralization less attractive);
·  Per capita income
(Fiscal decentralization may be less attractive for low income
countries due to both fixed costs and relatively low and
homogeneous demands for public goods and services);
·  Size of the country
                                                          
4 Panizza (1999) tests for the sign and significance of some of these determinants of fiscal
decentralization (income per capita, ethnic fractionalization, country size, and the
level of democracy). Using different estimation methods and a relatively large set of
countries, he finds for the period of about 1975 through 1985 that all these four
determinants are postively correlated with fiscal decentralization.15
(The smaller the size and population, the smaller the differences
in preferences may tend to be, reducing the potential gains from
decentralization);
·  The degree of urbanization or local and regional differences in
the diversification of tax bases
(The more tax bases of regions and communities are diversified
and the smaller the differences of this diversification between
communities are, the more attractive fiscal decentralization may
appear);
·  Diversity of ethnic groups
(If there is considerable ethnic fractionalization, fiscal
decentralization may become attractive as a means for
integration);
· Presence of true public goods and services
 (Goods and services supplied by governments that are not truly
public could be produced under private competition; low income
households could receive vouchers issued by the central
government; thus fiscal decentralization may appear less
attractive).
When theoretical considerations yield ambiguous results, empirical
analysis becomes even more important. Given the vagueness of
outcomes of theoretical analyses of fiscal decentralization, the case
for and against it ultimately hinges on empirical evidence as to
whether it promotes economic performance. However, as Oates
(1995) notes, such empirical evidence is scarce.  Oates (1995)
claims, however, that his own empirical research for a group of 40
countries yielded a statistically significant and robust positive
correlation between a measure of fiscal decentralisation (sub-
national government’s share of public expenditures) and per capita
economic growth.  He also claimed to have found a statistically
significant positive relationship between the change of a measure of
self-reliance of sub-national governments (own revenues of sub-
national governments as a share of total revenues) and per capita
economic growth.  This would indicate that a movement toward16
greater self-reliance of sub-national governments promotes
economic performance.
3  Analytical background and estimation proceedings
3.1 Analytical background
3.1.1 Theoretical growth analysis
In traditional, neoclassical growth theory the steady-state economic
growth rate is determined by the growth rate of the population (labor
force) and technical progress, both of which are exogenously given.
Growth is determined solely by the supply of factors and not
influenced by macroeconomic policies. With the rise of the
theoretical endogenous economic growth models (e.g. Romer, 1986,
Grossman and Helpman, 1990, Villanueva, 1993) effects of
economic policies on the growth process became explicitly
recognized. In addition, human capital was introduced in the
production function as a separate production factor. Consequently
the growth accounting equation was modified to either include
human capital separately or to replace raw labor by effective labor.
With human capital counted separately, the growth accounting
equation becomes:
(1) y = b1 k + b2 h + b3 l + b4  a ,
where y is the rate of growth of real GDP, k is the rate of growth of
physical capital, h is the rate of growth of human capital, l is the rate
of growth of raw labor, a is the rate of growth of overall efficiency
in combining capital (physical and human) and raw labor, and bi is
the elasticity of economic growth with respect to argument i.
In endogenous growth models one or several of the right hand side
variables in equation (1) are made dependent on one or several
variable(s) of interest, including policy variables. Usually, the
steady-state growth rate in these models depends positively on the
variable(s) of interest. Thus, economic growth can be higher than in17
traditional neoclassical growth models. The growth rate (and net
return on capital) can be larger than the sum of the exogenous rates
of population growth and technical progress. The capability of these
theoretical models to account for the potentially powerful effects of
government policies on economic growth inspired extensive
empirical work on these effects. Yet, there is still no consensus
theoretical model to guide empirical work on growth.
3.1.2 Empirical growth analysis
Two basic estimation approaches are employed in this empirical
work: First, growth equations are specified such that in addition to
the independent variables suggested by traditional neoclassical
growth theory (i.e. initial per capita income level, population growth
and the share of physical-investment in GDP) variables are included
that represent human capital investment, government policies and
political factors (e.g. Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1992; Knight et al., 1992, Barro 1997). Variables that
represent government policies include the share of government
consumption expenditures in GDP, measures of the degree of
openness of the economy, of the level of public infrastructure, of
macroeconomic stability (inflation, domestic credit growth, standard
deviation of inflation and of domestic credit growth) etc. However,
this approach is associated with interpretation difficulties, because it
implicitly assumes that the independent variables included in the
growth regression affect economic growth only through variables
that are not included. For instance, when estimating a growth
regression that includes measures for k, h and l in equation (1) and a
variable that represents a particular macroeconomic policy, it is
implicitly assumed that this variable does not affect economic
growth through its impact on k, h, and l but solely through its impact
on the productivity residual a. However, macroeconomic policies
and fiscal decentralization affect growth in particular via investment
in physical and human capital.
5
                                                          
5 In fact, if it is assumed that population growth and growth of the labor force (variable l in
equation 1) are determined mainly by non-economic factors and that physical and
human capital incorporate all productive knowlegde so that exogenous technical
progress (variable a in equation 1) becomes negligible, then differences of growth
rates among countries need to be explained mainly with differences in investment.18
A simple two step method that avoids this interpretation problem
and allows identification of the channels through which
macroeconomic policies affect economic growth was applied by
Fischer (1993) on the basis of a proposal by Elias (1992): First,
examine the relationships between growth and the policy variable(s)
of interest. Second, examine the relationships between the change in
both the supplies of production factors and the productivity residual,
on the one hand, and the macroeconomic variables of interest, on the
other
6.
In this paper, both approaches are used since the interpretation
problem associated with the first approach may become less serious
when additional evidence from the second approach is used.
3.1.3 Specific difficulties in examining potential growth effects of fiscal
decentralization
Establishing a statistically significant link between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth is associated with several
problems. Four main ones are:
·  A meaningful measure of fiscal decentralization needs to be
constructed. According to the definition of decentralization
adopted here, the share of expenditures of subnational
governments in consolidated government expenditures appears
to be reasonable indicator of decentralization. However, besides
problems of missing data in IMF Government Finance statistics
(even with regard to several advanced industrial countries) and
of the relatively small length of available time series (they begin
in the 1970s), there is the problem of data accuracy.
·  The theoretical considerations above indicated that the
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth, if existing, may not be linear. Rather, it could be that
“too little” fiscal decentralization is detrimental for long-term
                                                          
6 It has become popular in empirical studies whose goal is to measure the economic growth
effect of a particular variable to concentrate on regressions where capital formation
and factor productivity growth are the dependent variable. See, for instance,
Holzmannn’s analysis of the economic growth effects of the shift towards a capital-
funds based pension system in Chile (1997).19
economic growth: it provides too little incentives for subnational
governments to improve allocative and productive efficiency so
that the fixed costs it produces may become a net loss to society.
On the other hand, if there is “too much” fiscal decentralization,
a welfare loss could arise due to jeopardized stabilization,
instability and greater inequities. This may also hamper
economic growth in the long run. Hence, it may be hypothesized
that there exists a hump shaped relationship between
decentralization and economic performance such that a medium
level of fiscal decentralization may best enhance the growth
prospects. There is thus a need for testing for this nonlinear
relationship
7.
·  There is the difficulty of distinguishing effects of conditional
convergence (i.e. countries with a relatively low initial income
tend to have faster per capita growth than other countries after
controlling for differences in saving rates -i.e. investment rates in
a closed economy-, population growth, and technical progress)
and endogenous growth effects such as the potential effect
coming from fiscal decentralization.
·  With regard to an empirical analysis of Western European
countries, the fiscal powers of the supranational authority
European Union need to be considered.
8 The budget of the EU
and its legal powers regarding areas outside agriculture may be
considered to be rather limited. However, there have been
considerable grants and net transfers from the EU to a few
member countries (with relatively low income in EU
comparison). When estimating growth regressions for Western
European countries the effects of these transfers should be
controlled for.
                                                          
7 Note that a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of the centralization of wage
bargaining and real wages and unemployment (i.e. economic failure) was proposed by
Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Their suggestion for how to test for a hump-shaped
relationship is taken up below.
8 As Oates (1993, p.8) put it: “What we seem to be observing is a .. complicated process
with both decentralizing and centralizing forces at work, a process that is resulting, for
example, in devolution in a number of OECD countries and at the same time in a new
top layer of government in the European Community.”20
3.2 Estimation proceedings
3.2.1 Country sample
The sample includes 17 Western European countries (i.e. the
member countries of the European Union plus Norway and
Switzerland). However, to improve the statistical robustness 9
additional countries with a relatively large country size and different
income levels are also included (table 1).
3.2.2 Indicators of fiscal decentralization
Several indicators of fiscal decentralization are employed. Since this
study presents both pure cross-sectional regressions (using averages
of the annual data covering the period 1975-95) as well as pooled
cross-sectional (panel) regressions (covering the period 1981-95),
there are two types of indicators: those which are available as time
series can be used in both regressions. Those which are available
only as period averages can be used in the pure cross-sectional
regressions only.
The share of subnational government expenditures in consolidated
government expenditures is the best known indicator of fiscal
decentralization (indicator “A” in tables 1 and 2, denoted “IFDA” in
the regressions). This indicator is available on an annual basis since
about the 1970s, although surprisingly even for some advanced
industrial countries there are considerable gaps (the appendix
describes these gaps and the method used to fill some of them).
Regarding revenues, a measure of the self-reliance of subnational
governments is used, i.e. own revenues of subnational governments
as a share of their total revenues (denoted SR). The change of this
indicator is also considered (denoted CHSR).
Two additional indicators of fiscal decentralization have been found
in the political science literature (indicator B and C in table 1):
These two indicators refer to about the past three decades and are
not available as time series. Thus, they can be used only in pure
cross-sectional regressions and not in panel regressions.21
A fourth indicator was constructed to test for a non-linear (hump-
shaped) relationship between economic performance and fiscal
decentralization (denoted A’ in tables 1 and 2 and IFDA’ in the
regressions): for the pure cross-sectional regressions this indicator
was obtained by simply transforming the period averages of
indicator A such that low and high values become low values
whereas medium values of indicator A become high values (see
table 2). In the pooled cross-sectional regressions non-linearities in
the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, capital
formation and total factor productivity were estimated using a spline
function of indicator IFDA. The function breaks at shares of 30 and
45 percent of subnational government expenditures in consolidated
expenditures. The resulting three indicators are denoted FDL for
“low degree of fiscal decentralization”, FDM for “medium degree of
fiscal decentralization”, and FDH for “high degree of fiscal
decentralization”.
Table 1 presents correlation coefficients between the indicators A,
B, C, and A’ of the sample countries (i.e. indicators of the average
degree of fiscal decentralization during the past three decades or so)
on the one hand, and the per capita income level of 1998 (measured
in US-Dollars) and the average real per capita growth rate during the
past three decades, on the other hand. Fiscal decentralization, as
measured by the indicators A, B and C, is positively correlated with
the income level. (Note that in contrast to indicators A and B,
indicator C rises with increasing centralization). A relatively high,
positve correlation is found for Western Europe, especially if the
tiny state Luxembourg is excluded that has a low degree of fiscal
decentralization and the highest per capita income. Scandinavian
countries have traditionally relatively far reaching political powers
of local governments which is reflected in relatively high values of
indicator A of fiscal decentralization. These countries are also
among the wealthiest ones in Western Europe.
However, the correlation between the measures of fiscal
decentralization (indicators A, B and C) and average per capita
growth rates is negative for Western Europe while positive for other
countries. Interestingly, the coefficient of correlation between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth changes its sign for both22
Western European countries and the small group of low income
countries in the sample (which are middle income countries in world
comparison) if indicator A is replaced by the transformed indicator
A’ (which rises with a movement from either a high or low degree of
fiscal decentralization toward a medium degree).
These first impressions from table 1 suggest, first, that indeed the
income level needs to be considered when examining growth effects
of fiscal decentralization. Second, taken at face value, these simple
correlation coefficients would suggest that middle income countries
can reap more benefits from fiscal decentralization for their growth
and income performance than high income countries. For high
income countries the chances for economic growth may rise when
moving from a low or high degree of fiscal decentralization towards
a medium degree. Growth regressions may shed more light on these
questions.
3.2.3 Specification
Limited specifications are used for both the pure cross-sectional
growth regressions and the panel regressions so as to focus on a few
key factors. Nevertheless, the specifications are consistent with a
large assortment of endogenous growth models. The pure cross-
sectional per capita growth regressions use a set of independent
variables which are always included. These are the initial level of
real GDP per capita in 1970 (RGDP70) from Summers, Kravis,
Heston (1980) to consider the (conditional) convergence hypothesis,
the average annual rate of population growth (GPOP), the average
annual gross investment share of GDP (INVGDP), and the initial
secondary-school enrollment rate in 1970 (SEC70) from Unesco as a
proxy for the ratio of human capital investment to GDP
9.
Variables representing the degree of fiscal decentralization are the
average annual indicator IFDA, its transformation IFDA’ (to test for
a hump-shaped relationship) and the indicators B and C from the
                                                          
9 In the estimations the initial school enrollment ratio was found to have a higher
significance than the average school enrollment ratio over the considered period. This
could be explained with lags between completion of education and its appropriate use
as a production factor.23
political science literature. These four variables are denoted FD
variables and they are used as alternatives. Period averages of the
annual values of the proxy for self-reliance of subnational
governments (SR) and of the annual changes of this variable
(CHSR) are included to test for Oates (1995, p. 353) hypothesis that
increasing self-reliance promotes economic growth.
Also a dummy variable is included as a proxy for financial support
granted by the European Union to the countries Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain (DEU4). These countries received substantial
transfers from the European Union during the period considered and
this may have influenced their economic growth. Finally, to consider
the hypothesis that structural rigidities are pronounced in many
countries so that domestic and/or external disturbances can have a
relatively long lasting impact on economic growth, the average
annual change in the unemployment rate (CHUER) is included as a
proxy for such disturbances. In the very long run the impact of the
change of the unemployment rate disappears, however. The
estimated pure cross-sectional specification has thus the following
general form:
(2) GYP i = a + b1 RGDP70 i + b2 GPOP i + b3 INVGDP i
+ b4 SEC70 i + b5 CHUER i + b6  DUE4 i
+ b7 FD i + b8 SR i + b9 CHSR i + Î i ,
where GYP is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita, FD
is either IFDA, IFDA’, B or C. The subscript i is indexing the
country.
The equation was estimated using averages over the period 1975-95
for up to 26 countries. The expected signs of the estimated
coefficients are as follows: b1 is expected to be positive if there is
evidence for conditional convergence (i.e. if countries with
relatively low initial income tend to grow faster than other countries
after controlling for differences in the rates of investment in physical
and human capital, population growth and technical progress). The
expected effect of population growth on per capita economic growth
(b2) is negative. The effects of investment in physical capital and of
past investment in human capital (b3 and b4) are clearly positive. To24
the extent that due to structural rigidities of the economies
disturbances may have long lasting adverse effects on economic
growth b5 is expected to have a negative sign. b6 is expected to be
positive if this dummy coefficient captures the effect of grants from
the EU and if these grants are used as intended, i.e. for
improvements of the physical and institutional infrastructure of the
recipient countries. Finally, the signs of major interest in this study
b7,  b8 and b9 are not clear because theory suggests that fiscal
decentralization may have a positive and negative influence on
economic growth. In addition, it is not clear, a priori, whether there
are nonlinear effects of fiscal decentralization.
Turning to the panel growth regressions, initial income is replaced
by the real per capita growth rate of the previous year. However, in
preliminary estimations this variable was generally not significant
and its inclusion did not raise but lowered the explained variation of
per capita growth. It was therefore dropped from most of the
estimated panel equations. To account nevertheless for (conditional)
convergence effects, a dummy variable was included for countries
with relatively low income. In regressions with data for the Western
European countries, a dummy is included for 5 countries with
relatively low initial income, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain (denoted DEU5). Note, however, that four of these five
countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain received
substantial net transfers from the European Union during much of
the considered time period and, thus, this dummy is likely to capture
at least two effects: potential (conditional) convergence effects and
effects of financial support granted by the European Union. In
regressions with data for the full sample a dummy for European and
non-European countries with relatively low initial income is
included (denoted DLI)
10.
Preliminary estimations also showed that the gross investment share
of GDP was insignificant and in some cases even had the wrong
sign. Therefore, this indicator of physical investment was replaced
                                                          
10 These countries are: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Korea,
New Zealand, and South Africa.25
by the growth rate of real gross fixed capital formation
11. Also
included in the panel regressions are the secondary school
enrollment ratio as a proxy for investment in human capital (SEC),
the change in the unemployment ratio as a proxy for macroeconomic
disturbances, and, of course, measures of fiscal decentralization. The
latter are the share of subnational government expenditures in
consolidated expenditures (IFDA) and, as an alternative, the three
categories of fiscal decentralization (low, medium and high fiscal
decentralization) to test for nonlinear effects. In addition, the
variables SR and CHSR are also included. The general form of the
estimated panel regressions thus is:
(3) GYP i, t  = a + b1 GYP i, t-1 + b2 GPOP i, t
+ b3 GKAP i, t + b4 SEC i, t + b5 CHUER i, t
+ b6  DUE5 i, t + b7 DLI i, t + b8 FD i, t
+ b9 SR i, t + b10 CHSR i, t + Î i, t ,
where GKAP is the annual growth rate of real gross fixed capital
formation as an indicator of physical investment, SEC is the annual
secondary scholl enrollment ratio, and DEU5 and DLI are dummy
variables as explained above and used alternatingly. FD represents
the indicators of fiscal decentralization, i.e. either the share of
subnational government expenditures in consolidated government
expenditures (IFDA), on the one hand, or the indicators FDL, FDM,
and FDH to test for non-linear effects, on the other hand. The
subscripts i and t are indexing the country and time period.
The equation was estimated for the period 1981 through 1995. The
expected signs for b1 and b2 are negative, for b3 and b4, positive, for
b5, negative, and for b6 and b7, positive. The signs for b8, b9 and b10
are not clear a priori.
Based on the growth accounting framework two additional panel
regressions were estimated to examine the channels through which
fiscal decentralization may influence economic growth: First, capital
                                                          
11 Under the assumption that real capital stock depreciation is a relatively stable share of
real gross investment, the latter is highly positively correlated with real net investment
and thus also with the change in the real capital stock.26
formation was examined and, second, total factor productivity
growth (the Solow residual).
Capital formation is specified as a function of macroeconomic
policy variables, including measures of fiscal decentralization, of
macroeconomic disturbances (cyclical effects) and of a dummy
variable to capture catch-up effects of countries with relatively low
initial income. With regard to the four mentioned Western European
countries with relatively low income that received considerable net
transfers from the European Union, the dummy variable is likely,
however, to not only capture convergence effects but also effects of
grants from the European Union. Macroeconomic policy variables
include the fiscal balance as a share of GDP (denoted FBGDP), the
inflation rate (denoted GCPI), and uncertainty of economic agents
with regard to macroeconomic stability, which is proxied by the
standard deviation of dometic credit for overlapping five year
periods (denoted STDDC)
12. The employed measures of fiscal
decentralization are the same as those used in the previous equation.
Macroeconomic disturbances are proxied, as before, by the change
in the unemployment rate (CHUER). Those regressions that are
estimated with data for the Western European countries include a
dummy variable for the four countries that received substantial
grants from the European Union (DEU4). The regressions estimated
with data for all sample countries include a dummy for countries
with relatively low initial income (DLI). Thus, the estimated
equations have the general form:
(4) GKAP i, t  = a + b1 GKAP i, t-1 + b2 FBGDP i, t
+ b3 GCPI i, t + b4 STDDC i, t + b5 CHUER i, t
+ b6  DUE4 i, t + b7 DLI i, t + b8 FD i, t
+ b9 SR i, t + b10 CHSR i, t + Î i, t ,
where the dummy variables (DEU4 and DLI) are used alternatingly.
As before, FD represents either the indicator IFDA or the indicators
FDL, FDM, and FDH. The expected signs of the estimated
coefficients are b1 > 0, b2 > 0 to the extent that the potential
                                                          
12 The standard deviation is calculated for overlapping five year periods where the last 4
years, the current year and the following year are considered.27
crowding out effect of budget deficits prevails, b3, b4, and b5 < 0,
since inflation, uncertainty and disturbances are likely to inhibit
capital formation, and b6 and b7 > 0, because of catch-up effects and
due to the effects of the grants provided by the European Union.
Again, the effects of the measures of fiscal decentralization b8, b9,
and b10 are unclear.
Finally, panel equations are estimated to examine the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and total factor productivity growth
(RES). The latter was calculated for the sample countries as a Solow
residual
13. Independent variables included are the unemployment
rate (UER), lagged one period, as a measure of cyclical effects on
productivity growth, dummy variables for Western European
countries and for other countries with relatively low income to
capture potential catch-up effects and effects of European Union
grants, and the indicators of fiscal decentralization. Hence, the
general form of the estimated equations is:
(5) RES i, t  = a + b1 RES i, t-1 + b2 UER i, t-1 + b3  DUE4 i, t
+ b4 DLI i, t + b5 FD i, t + b6 SR i, t
+ b7 CHSR i, t + Î i, t .
The expected signs are  b1 > 0, b2 < 0, b3 and  b4 > 0. The signs of
b5 , b6  and  b7 are unclear.
                                                          
13 Asuming a constant labor share of income of 0.65 the residuals were calculated as:   
RESit = GDPRit - 0,35 GKAPit - 0,65 GLAFOit , where GDPR is the growth rate of
real GDP, GKAP is the growth rate of the real capital stock, and GLAFO is the
growth rate of the labor force, i = 1, …26; t = 1981-1995. Note that the underlying
assumptions of this procedure (constant factor shares, no consideration given to the
quality of factor inputs etc.) are very restrictive, which is necessitated by data
constraints.28
4 Estimation results
4.1 Pure and pooled cross-sectional growth equations
Table 3 presents the pure cross-sectional regressions for the twenty
year period 1975-1995. The variables that are always included in the
regressions have in almost all cases the expected sign and are in
general highly significant. There is strong evidence for (conditional)
convergence since initial income (RGDP70) lowers the per capita
economic growth rate. Investment in physical and human capital are
positively related to per capita economic growth while population
growth tends to lower per capita growth. This latter relationship is,
however, not obtained in all estimated equations and thus
ambiguous. The considered twenty year period was characterized by
a trend rise of unemployment rates in many countries reflecting deep
sitting structural rigidities. These have been costly in terms of per
capita growth, as indicated by the estimated coefficients of the
variable CHUER. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable
for four “low” income Western European countries (DEU4) is in
most cases significant and positive. It suggests that even when
controlling for convergence effects, per capita growth in these
countries was on average almost half a percentage point higher than
in the other Western European countries. Hence, it appears that EU
grants to these countries indeed had a positive impact on growth.
In the pooled cross-sectional growth regressions presented in table 4
the initial income variable is replaced either by dummy variables for
countries with relatively low income (DEU5 and DLI) or by the
growth rate of real per capita GDP, lagged one period. In addition,
the investment to GDP ratio is replaced by a proxy for the growth
rate of the real capital stock, and the secondary school enrollment
ratio of 1970 is replaced by the annual secondary school enrollment
ratio. While the variables population growth and capital stock
growth have the expected signs and are highly significant, the school
enrollment variable is in all of the estimated panel equations (table
4) not significant and even has in some cases the unexpected
negative sign. Apparently, the addition of the time series dimension
to the cross-sectional dimension causes a break down of the29
significance of this regressor. This result has been found also in
other empirical growth studies (e.g. Knight et al., 1992). One major
reason for this may be that there is a considerable time lag between
accomplishment of school education and the contribution of
educated labor to production and economic growth
14.
The variables of main interest in this study are the fiscal
decentralization indicators. The share of subnational government
expenditures in consolidated government expenditures (IFDA) is not
significant in the growth regressions for European countries
(equations 2a and 2d, table 3). However, this indicator is significant
for the whole sample (equations 2g and 2j). But this significance
disappears and the IFDA coefficient for European countries
becomes even negative when adding the time series dimension in
data, i.e. when estimating panel regressions (equations 3a and 3e,
table 4)
15. Apparently, the time series relation between fiscal
decentralization as measured by indicator IFDA and growth (the
effect of changes in the fiscal decentralization measure on growth
within each country over time) was negative in Western Europe
during the period considered.
The indicators B and C of fiscal decentralization from the political
science literature can be used only in the pure cross-sectional
regressions. They are significant only in the regressions with data for
European countries (not shown in table 3) and they indicate that
higher decentralization is associated with lower per capita growth in
Western Europe. This corresponds to the negative, albeit
insignificant, sign of the IFDA variable found in the panel regression
3a for Western European countries. So far then the impression is that
at least for Western Europe the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth may even be negative.
Substantial further insight can, however, be gained by testing for a
nonlinear relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth. This requires use of the transformed indicator IFDA’ instead
                                                          
14 Given that this study focuses on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth, no attempt has been made to redefine this proxy variable for human
capital.
15 Due to data constraints the pooled cross-sectional regressions presented in table 4 use the
time period 1981 through 1995.30
of indicator IFDA in the pure cross-sectional regressions. In the
panel regressions the spline function of fiscal decentralization needs
to be substituted for indicator IFDA (with fiscal decentralization
broken into the three categories FDL, FDM, FDH).
Equations 2c and 2e, table 3, show that for Western European
countries the indicator IFDA’ is significant and positive, suggesting
that indeed the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth may not be linear. Rather, it appears that for
Western European countries there is evidence supporting the
hypothesis of a hump shaped relationship between per capita
economic growth and fiscal decentralization. By contrast, when
estimating pure cross-sectional regressions where all countries in the
sample are included, the indicator IFDA’ is barely significant but
IFDA is (equations 2g and 2j in table 3 need to be compared with
equations 2h and 2k). This suggests that for non-European countries
in the sample there is a positive association between fiscal
decentralization and per capita economic growth. The pooled cross-
sectional regressions (table 4) confirm this: Equation 3c shows that
for Western European countries the variable FDM (medium degree
of fiscal decentralization) has a slightly larger estimated coefficient
than the variables FDL (low degree of fiscal decentralization) and
FDH (high degree of fiscal decentralization). In other words, in
Western Europe, a medium degree of fiscal decentralization was
associated with a slightly higher per capita growth rate than either a
low degree or high degree of fiscal decentralization.
For the full sample it is found, however, that with an increasing
degree of fiscal decentralization, the per capita growth rate tends to
increase (equation 3f). Splitting the sample into one group that
includes 9 countries with relatively low income and another group
that includes 12 countries with relatively high income shows that
these two country groups differ with regard to the existing
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth:
For the country group with relatively low income the association
between fiscal decentralization and growth strengthens substantially
as fiscal decentralization rises (equation 3j, table 4). The higher the
decentralization category, the higher becomes both the estimated
coefficient and the significance. By contrast, for the country group31
with relatively high income the medium category of fiscal
decentralization (FDM) has both a larger estimated coefficient and
higher significance than the other two categories (equation 3k, table
4).
Regarding the relationship between the measure of self-reliance of
subnational governments (SR) and its change (CHSR), on the one
hand, and economic growth, on the other hand, the evidence from
pure cross-sectional regressions (table 3) suggests that both variables
are even negatively related to economic growth. However, when
adding the time series dimension to the pure cross-sectional
dimension (table 4) the estimated coefficient of the change of the
self-reliance variable (CHSR) becomes positive and in some cases
significant (equations 3h and 3k, table 4). This finding provides
support for Oates’ (1995) claim that increasing self-reliance of
subnational governments on own revenues is beneficial for
economic growth.
However, these results do not yet shed light on the channels through
which fiscal decentralization and increasing self-reliance of
subnational governments may affect economic growth. This is
discussed in the following two sections.
4.2 Capital formation panel equations
Table 5 shows the panel regressions of capital formation. Capital
stock growth lagged one period (GKAP (-1)), the inflation rate
(GCPI), the proxy for macroeconomic disturbances (CHUER) and
the dummy variables (DEU4, DLI) all have the expected signs and
are in general highly significant. Interestingly, the estimated
coefficients of the variables fiscal balance as a share of GDP
(FBGDP), inflation (GCPI), and macroeconomic uncertainty
(STDDC), are larger and more significant for the group of relatively
wealthy countries (equations 4a- 4c, and 4h) than for the group of
countries with relatively low income (equation 4g).
The association between capital formation and fiscal
decentralization is similar to the one between per capita growth and
fiscal decentralization: For Western European and high income
countries the relationship does not appear to be linear (the IFDA32
variable is not significant). For Western European countries it is the
medium category of fiscal decentralization that has the largest
estimated coefficient (equations 4b and 4c), i.e. growth of the real
capital stock tends to be larger in countries with a medium degree of
fiscal decentralization than in countries with either a low or high
degree of decentralization. Taken at face value the estimated
coefficients of the fiscal decentralization variables FDL, FDM, and
FDH for Western European countries suggest the following: After
controlling for the influence on capital stock growth of
macroeconomic policies (fiscal balance, inflation), of uncertainty
and of macroeconomic disturbances, the capital stock grew at least
0.4 percentage points per year faster in countries with a medium
degree of fiscal decentralization than in countries with either a low
or high degree of decentralization. Given that the average annual
growth of the estimated real capital stock for the 17 Western
European countries during 1975-1995 was about 2.5 percent, this is
a considerable difference. The finding that a medium degree of fiscal
decentralization is associated with higher capital stock growth holds
also for the group of 12 wealthiest countries in the sample (equation
4h). For these countries the estimation suggests that a medium
degree of fiscal decentralization may raise annual capital stock
growth by even more than 1 percentage point. By contrast, for the
group of 9 countries in the sample with relatively low per capita
income (equation 4g), the estimated coefficients of the three
categories of fiscal decentralization and their significance increase
with increasing decentralization.
Turning to the self-reliance indicators (SR and CHSR) table 5 shows
that the signs are as expected but in most cases the indicators are not
significant at the 5 percent level. However, in the regression for all
countries for whom these data are available the change of the self-
reliance ratio (CHSR) is significant at the 10 percent level
(equations 4d and 4e). Overall, the evidence appears to support the
hypothesis of a positive association between increasing self-reliance
of subnational governments and capital formation.
These results provide explanations for the estimated relationships
between per capita economic growth and fiscal decentralization
discussed in the previous section: Increasing fiscal decentralization33
in low income countries of the sample is on average statistically
significantly associated with higher per capita economic growth
through higher capital formation. With regard to high income
countries and Western European countries the medium category of
fiscal decentralization is estimated to have the largest positive
impact on capital formation. Hence, the growth regressions for these
countries showed that a medium degree of fiscal decentralization is
associated with higher economic growth than either a low or high
degree of fiscal decentralization.
4.3 Total factor productivity panel equations
Finally, the relationship between total factor productivity growth and
fiscal decentralization is examined (table 6). Obtaining a satisfactory
statistical fit proved to be difficult. The explained portion of the
variation in total factor productivity growth is relatively low.
However, the results confirm the impression gained in the previous
estimations that the income level needs to be considered when
examining the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic performance: table 6 suggests that in the countries with
relatively low income in the sample, the association between fiscal
decentralization and growth of total factor productivity on average
becomes stronger as fiscal decentralization increases (equation 5c).
In other words, in these countries increasing fiscal decentralization
is on average statistically significantly associated with higher total
factor productivity growth. By contrast, regarding wealthy countries
and the group of Western European countries the opposite is found,
i.e. a lower degree of fiscal decentralization is associated with higher
total factor productivity growth (equations 5a, 5b, and 5d).
Interestingly, in these regressions the dummy for the four Western
European countries that received substantial net transfers from the
European Union proved insignificant. This suggests that these
transfers had little influence on total factor productivity growth. The
growth promoting effect of these transfers was thus mainly the result
of their positive influence on capital formation.
The self-reliance indicators (SR and CHSR) did not prove to be
significant regressors in the total factor productivity growth34
regressions. This would suggest that the positive association
between increasing self-reliance of subnational governments and
economic growth - which was found in the panel growth regressions
– needs to be explained with the positive impact of increasing self-
reliance on capital formation.
5 Concluding remarks
The foregoing empirical analysis suggests for high income countries,
in particular Western European countries, a hump-shaped relation
between per capita economic growth and capital formation, on the
one hand, and fiscal decentralization, on the other hand. By contrast,
for countries with middle income (low income countries in the
sample), the association between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth and its determinants (capital formation and total
factor productivity growth) becomes stronger as fiscal
decentralization increases. Regarding the relation between economic
performance and reliance of subnational governments on own
revenue sources (own taxes and shared taxes) to finance their
expenditures, there is empirical evidence suggesting that capital
formation is positively related to increasing self-reliance, thus
confirming Oates (1995).
It must be emphasized that this evidence refers to a limited group of
(non-transition) countries and to a certain time period. Thus, it can
serve as an illustration only. This evidence may be discussed in light
of the criteria for the choice of fiscal decentralization derived in the
theoretical part of this paper in section 2. There it was argued that
the following characteristics of a country would tend to make fiscal
decentralization a less attractive option for policy makers:
-  Fiscal decentralization causes fixed costs which may be viewed
too high relative to its potential benefits particularly in low
income countries.
-  Relatively low and homogeneous demand for public goods.
-  Poor quality of local government and of local democracy.
-  Large income differentials between households and regions.35
-  Low degree of urbanization, i.e. little diversified tax bases in the
regions.
-  Relatively small size of a country and of its population.
-  Little diversity of ethnic groups.
-  Scarcity of true public goods and services.
For a high income country it could be expected that especially the
first three criteria are less relevant. Assuming further that
-  tax bases are relatively diversified in all regions of a high income
country,
-  that even when such a country has a relatively small size and
population there are pronounced differences in the preferences of
individuals and that
-  the demand for public goods and services is relatively income
elastic and high,
then there remains only one argument that could explain why such a
high income country may wish to limit the degree of fiscal
decentralization. This is the fourth argument, i.e. relatively large
income differentials between households and regions that would
emerge in the absence of redistributional policy. Since effective
redistributional policy requires central government intervention this
may be an important reason for a high income country with
pronounced differences of individuals’ tastes and preferences to
limit the degree of fiscal decentralization. In fact, if unattended
income differentials between households and regions may hinder
long run economic growth and development. This line of reasoning
could be a tentative explanation for a hump-shaped relationship
between economic growth and capital formation, on the one hand,
and fiscal decentralization, on the other, in high income countries.
With regard to middle income countries, those that were considered
in this study do not have such relatively high degrees of fiscal
decentralization as can be found in the group of high income
countries. In other words, in the middle income countries that are
considered in the sample the central government redistributes on
average a somewhat larger share of consolidated government
revenues than in the very high income countries. This needs to be
considered when interpreting the above empirical finding that in36
these countries an increasing degree of fiscal decentralization tends
to be associated with higher capital formation and a better growth
performance.
Another consideration is that at a somewhat lower stage of economic
development the benefits of fiscal decentralization with respect to
efficient public investment (in educational institutions, roads,
utilities etc.) and efficient production of public goods and services
could be more pronounced than at a later stage when major
infrastructure projects are already completed. Under this assumption,
a marginal increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization in a
middle income country could yield higher benefits regarding
economic growth than in an already highly developed country,
especially if the degree of fiscal decentralization is not yet relatively
high.
In sum, it could be argued that there are diminishing returns to fiscal
decentralization which for middle income countries in the study did
not yet set in so that for them a positive association between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth results.37
Appendix: Data sources for and definitions of
indicators of fiscal decentralization
The share of subnational government expenditures in consolidated
government expenditures (denoted indicator “A” in tables 1 and 2,
and “IFDA” in tables 3-6 that show the regression results) was taken
from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook from the
International Monetary Fund. The cross-sectional regressions use
annual averages over the period 1975 through 1995. However, due
to missing data the following shorter periods had to be used in
constructing period averages for 4 Western European countries and
3 other countries: Belgium: 1978-95, Greece: 1972-81, Italy: 1985-
89 and 1995; Portugal: 1975-77 and 1987-95; Korea: 1976-78, New
Zealand: 1978-81 and 1992-95, Japan: 1972-74. For the panel
regressions, which use the shorter period of 1981 through 1995, it
appeared justifiable in the cases of Italy, Portugal, and New Zealand
to construct the missing data: For Italy missing data for 1990-94
were constructed by assuming that the indicator evolves linearly
from 1989 to 1995. For Portugal and New Zealand the missing years
1981-86 and 1982-91, respectively, were similarly constructed. In
these three cases a relatively minor variation in the indicator values
that sorround the missing years may justify the approach used here
to fill data gaps. This procedure was, however, not deemed
justifiable in the cases of Greece, Japan and Korea. Hence, for these
countries the indicator IFDA is not available as a time series.
The indicator of self-reliance of subnational governments (i.e. own
revenues of subnational governments as a share of their total
revenues, denoted SR and its change, denoted CHSR) was also taken
from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. The calculation
of period averages of SR and of CHSR for use in the pure cross-
sectional regressions was associated with the problem of missing
data for the same countries and years that are mentioned in the
previous paragraph with regard to indicator IFDA. For the panel
regressions missing data points of SR and CHSR for Italy have been
constructed using the approach described in the previous paragraph.38
For other countries with data gaps this procedure did not appear to
be justifiable. Consequently indicators SR and CHSR are not
available as time series for Greece, Portugal, Japan, Korea and New
Zealand.
To test for a non-linear relationship between fiscal decentralization
and economic growth and its determinants in the pooled cross-
sectional regressions a spline function of indicator IFDA was used.
The function breaks at shares of 30 and 45 percent of subnational
government expenditures in consolidated expenditures. The resulting
three indicators are denoted FDL for “low degree of fiscal
decentralization”, FDM for “medium degree of fiscal
decentralization”, and FDH for “high degree of fiscal
decentralization”. These indicators were constructed for all countries
in the sample. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and New Zealand the
available IFDA data are substantially below a 30% share of
subnational government expenditures in total government
expenditures. Therefore, years of missing data for these countries
were classified as ones that fall in the category of a “low degree of
fiscal decentralization (FDL)”. In the case of Japan it was assumed
that the medium range of fiscal decentralization which prevailed in
the beginning of the 1970s was maintained throughout the period
under consideration. For Korea it was assumed that the relatively
high degree of fiscal decentralization (according to the classification
adopted here), which prevailed in the second half of the 1970s, was
maintained.39
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Summary:
Following a brief review of the theoretical literature on the benefits
and shortcomings of fiscal decentralization this paper presents an
empirical analysis of the relationship between per capita economic
growth and its production function determinants, on the one hand,
and constructed indicators of fiscal decentralization, on the other
hand. The analysis suggests for high income countries, in particular
Western European countries, a hump-shaped relation between per
capita economic growth and capital formation, on the one hand, and
fiscal decentralization, on the other hand. By contrast, for countries
with middle income, the association between fiscal decentralization
and economic growth and its determinants (capital formation and
total factor productivity growth) becomes stronger as fiscal
decentralization increases.
Zusammenfassung:
Das Papier gibt zunächst einen Überblick über die theoretischen
Argumente für und gegen fiskalische Dezentralisierung. Für
westeuropäische Länder sowie ausgewählte weitere Länder mit
mittlerem Einkommensniveau wird dann eine empirische Analyse
des Zusammenhangs zwischen Indikatoren des fiskalischen
Dezentralisierungsgrades und dem wirtschaftlichen Wachstum
durchgeführt. Als abhängige Variable in den Regressionen wird aber
nicht nur das Wirtschaftswachstum berücksichtigt, sondern auch
zwei Komponenten des Wirtschaftswachstums, nämlich
Kapitalbildung und Wachstum der totalen Faktorproduktivität. Die
Ergebnisse sind, daß für Länder mit hohem Einkommen und
westeuropäische Länder kein linearer Zusammenhang zwischen
Wirtschaftswachstum und seinen Komponenten -auf der einen Seite-
und fiskalischer Dezentralisierung -auf der anderen Seite- zu
bestehen scheint. Vielmehr scheint dieser Zusammenhang
“glockenförmig” zu sein.  Dagegen gilt für die Länder mit relativ
niedrigem Einkommensniveau der Stichprobe (dies sind Länder mit
mittlerem Einkommensniveau nach der Klassifizierung der
Weltbank), daß zunehmende fiskalische Dezentralisierung mit


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Derivation of indicator A’ of fiscal decentralization to test for
a nonlinear relationship (a hump shaped relation) between
economic growth and the degree of fiscal decentralization
Indicator A Ranking Indicator A’ 1)
Canada 0,684 1 1
Switzerland 0,582 2 3
Denmark 0,569 3 5
United States  0,509 4 7
Australia 0,502 5 9
Germany 0,462 6 11
Finland 0,443 7 13
Sweden 0,423 8 15
Korea 0,418 9 17
Japan 0,405 10 19
Brazil 0,383 11 21
Norway 0,380 12 23
Argentina 0,373 13 26
Austria 0,335 14 26
Netherlands 0,311 15 23
Ireland 0,300 16 21
South Africa 0,299 17 19
United Kingdom  0,293 18 17
Italy 0,257 19 15
Spain 0,230 20 13
France 0,179 21 11
Luxembourg 0,165 22 9
Belgium 0,128 23 7
New Zealand 0,112 24 5
Portugal 0,084 25 3
Greece 0,042 26 1
1) Starting with the lowest and highest values of indicator A
these are given a value of one. The next lowest and 
highest values of indicator A are given higher values and
this procedure is continued up to the medium range values
of indicator A which receive the highest values.
This transformation of indicator A allows to test for a hump shaped
relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization, 
i.e. whether a medium degree of fiscal decentralization is more
likely to be positively related to economic growth than either a 
relatively low or high degree.
Source: Own calculation.T
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u
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
7
5
-
9
5
;
 
C
H
S
R
:
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
l
f
-
r
e
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
1
9
7
5
-
9
5
.
2
)
 
A
l
l
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
l
i
s
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
2
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
d
a
t
a
.
N
o
t
e
:
 
G
L
S
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
c
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
s
)
 
i
s
 
u
s
e
d
.
 
T
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
;
 
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
.
’
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
9
0
 
t
o
 
9
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
O
w
n
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
.T
a
b
l
e
 
4
P
o
o
l
e
d
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
:
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
G
D
P
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
1
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
E
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
G
D
P
R
(
-
1
)
G
P
O
P
G
K
A
P
S
E
C
C
H
U
E
R
D
E
U
5
D
L
I
I
F
D
A
F
D
L
F
D
M
F
D
H
S
R
C
H
S
R
R
2
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
6
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
1
7
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
)
:
(
3
a
)
0
,
0
2
-
0
,
6
0
0
,
1
3
0
,
0
0
2
-
0
,
0
0
4
0
,
0
0
5
-
0
,
0
0
6
0
,
7
0
9
6
,
1
2
4
1
(
3
.
0
4
)
*
(
-
1
5
.
6
8
)
*
(
1
0
.
5
9
)
*
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
-
4
.
7
0
)
*
(
2
.
5
2
)
*
(
-
0
.
8
9
)
1
7
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
:
(
3
b
)
0
,
0
1
6
-
0
,
5
9
0
,
1
1
0
,
0
0
1
-
0
,
0
0
5
0
,
0
0
4
0
,
6
9
1
1
3
,
6
2
5
5
(
3
.
1
3
)
*
(
-
1
5
.
1
4
)
*
(
1
0
.
1
1
)
*
(
0
.
2
4
)
(
-
6
.
0
8
)
*
(
2
.
5
3
)
*
(
3
c
)
-
0
.
5
9
0
,
1
1
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
,
0
0
5
0
,
0
0
4
0
,
0
1
7
0
,
0
1
8
0
,
0
1
3
0
,
7
0
8
4
,
0
2
5
5
(
-
1
6
.
7
4
)
*
(
1
0
.
0
9
)
*
(
-
0
.
1
8
)
(
-
5
.
9
9
)
*
(
1
.
8
1
)
’
(
3
.
2
5
)
*
(
3
.
1
3
)
*
(
2
.
3
8
)
*
1
5
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
1
7
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
)
:
(
3
d
)
-
0
.
6
1
0
,
1
4
-
0
.
0
0
1
-
0
,
0
0
4
0
,
0
0
5
0
,
0
1
8
0
,
0
1
8
0
,
0
1
4
-
0
,
0
0
1
0
,
0
4
0
,
7
2
6
7
,
0
2
3
4
(
-
1
7
.
4
0
)
*
(
1
0
.
6
0
)
*
(
-
0
.
2
1
)
(
-
4
.
1
3
)
*
(
2
.
4
4
)
*
(
2
.
6
0
)
*
(
2
.
3
7
)
*
(
1
.
7
8
)
’
(
-
0
.
1
4
)
(
1
.
6
2
)
2
2
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
2
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
)
:
(
3
e
)
0
,
0
1
5
-
0
,
6
1
0
,
1
4
0
,
0
0
3
-
0
,
0
0
6
0
,
0
0
3
0
,
0
0
2
0
,
6
9
1
2
5
,
1
3
3
1
(
2
.
9
9
)
*
(
-
1
6
.
4
9
)
*
(
1
2
.
4
2
)
*
(
0
.
6
0
)
(
-
6
.
8
1
)
*
(
1
.
7
7
)
’
(
0
.
4
1
)
2
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
)
:
(
3
f
)
-
0
,
6
0
0
,
1
3
0
,
0
0
3
-
0
,
0
0
7
0
,
0
0
6
0
,
0
1
3
4
0
,
0
1
5
8
0
,
0
1
6
3
0
,
6
6
1
0
3
,
3
3
7
5
(
-
1
5
.
6
7
)
*
(
1
1
.
9
4
)
*
(
0
.
7
4
)
(
-
7
.
7
9
)
*
(
2
.
8
7
)
*
(
2
.
8
1
)
*
(
3
.
3
2
)
*
(
3
.
5
8
)
*
2
6
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
:
(
3
g
)
-
0
,
6
7
0
,
1
8
0
,
0
0
3
0
,
0
0
3
0
,
0
1
2
0
,
0
1
3
0
,
0
1
5
0
,
6
3
1
1
1
,
9
3
9
0
(
-
1
4
.
6
6
)
*
(
2
0
.
8
0
)
*
(
0
.
6
2
)
(
1
.
7
9
)
’
(
2
.
5
6
)
*
(
2
.
6
5
)
*
(
3
.
0
7
)
*
2
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
)
:
(
3
h
)
-
0
,
6
1
0
,
1
4
-
0
.
0
0
0
1
-
0
,
0
0
5
-
0
,
0
0
4
0
,
0
2
0
0
,
0
2
2
0
,
0
2
1
-
0
,
0
0
6
0
,
0
5
0
,
8
3
1
6
8
,
0
3
1
2
(
-
1
8
.
0
8
)
*
(
1
3
.
3
9
)
*
(
-
0
.
0
2
)
(
-
6
.
2
8
)
*
(
-
1
.
8
7
)
’
(
3
.
5
5
)
*
(
3
.
5
6
)
*
(
3
.
4
9
)
*
(
-
1
.
3
7
)
(
2
.
2
4
)
*
6
 
n
o
n
-
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
,
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
,
 
U
S
A
,
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
,
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
)
:
(
3
i
)
-
1
.
3
2
0
,
2
0
0
,
0
2
5
0
,
0
1
4
0
,
0
3
8
0
,
0
2
1
-
0
.
0
2
6
0
,
0
6
0
,
5
7
1
8
,
2
9
3
(
-
4
.
0
9
)
*
(
7
.
9
4
)
*
(
1
.
3
9
)
(
0
.
7
6
)
(
2
.
1
9
)
*
(
1
.
1
4
)
(
-
1
.
3
8
)
(
0
.
5
6
)
9
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
"
l
o
w
"
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
(
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
,
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
,
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
)
:
 
(
3
j
)
0
.
0
7
-
1
.
5
0
0
,
1
3
-
0
.
0
0
4
0
,
0
2
6
0
,
0
3
1
0
,
0
6
3
0
,
7
1
5
6
,
3
1
3
5
(
1
.
1
9
)
(
-
7
.
4
6
)
*
(
8
.
5
1
)
*
(
-
0
.
4
3
)
(
3
.
0
4
)
*
(
3
.
3
1
)
*
(
5
.
8
7
)
*
1
2
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
2
)
:
(
3
k
)
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
5
5
0
,
1
-
0
.
0
0
4
-
0
.
0
0
9
0
,
0
2
1
0
,
0
2
4
0
,
0
2
1
0
,
0
0
0
6
0
,
1
1
0
,
7
2
5
1
,
9
1
8
0
(
-
2
.
1
1
)
*
(
-
1
4
.
3
6
)
*
(
6
.
1
8
)
*
(
-
0
.
4
8
)
(
-
5
.
8
6
)
*
(
2
.
1
9
)
*
(
2
.
3
2
)
*
(
2
.
0
5
)
*
(
0
.
0
8
)
(
2
.
2
6
)
*
1
)
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
8
1
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
1
9
9
5
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
1
7
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
9
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
G
D
P
R
(
-
1
)
:
 
P
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
r
e
a
l
 
G
D
P
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
l
a
g
g
e
d
 
o
n
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
;
 
G
P
O
P
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
G
K
A
P
:
 
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
u
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
:
G
r
o
s
s
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
,
 
o
r
,
 
i
f
 
n
o
t
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
C
P
I
,
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
 
r
e
a
l
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
 
U
n
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
d
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
a
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
s
t
a
b
l
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
t
e
r
 
i
s
 
h
i
g
h
l
y
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
a
l
 
n
e
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
u
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
,
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
n
e
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
e
q
u
a
l
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
.
S
E
C
:
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
 
e
n
r
o
l
l
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
;
 
C
H
U
E
R
:
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
;
 
D
E
U
5
 
a
n
d
 
D
L
I
 
a
r
e
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
"
c
o
n
v
e
r
g
e
n
c
e
"
 
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
:
 
D
E
U
5
:
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
v
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
"
l
o
w
"
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
,
 
i
.
e
.
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
I
t
a
l
y
;
D
L
I
:
 
D
u
m
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
l
o
w
 
"
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
"
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
,
 
i
.
e
.
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
,
 
I
t
a
l
y
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
,
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
,
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
.
I
F
D
A
:
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
s
e
e
 
f
o
o
t
n
o
t
e
 
1
,
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
I
F
D
L
,
 
I
F
D
M
,
 
I
F
D
H
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
t
o
 
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
n
o
n
-
l
i
n
e
a
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
p
l
i
n
e
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
b
r
e
a
k
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
0
.
3
 
a
n
d
 
0
.
4
5
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
A
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
2
:
F
D
L
 
(
"
l
o
w
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
"
)
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
h
e
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
A
 
i
s
 
3
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
r
 
l
e
s
s
,
F
D
M
 
(
"
m
e
d
i
u
m
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
"
)
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
h
e
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
A
 
i
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
3
0
 
a
n
d
 
4
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
.
F
D
H
 
(
"
h
i
g
h
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
"
)
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
h
e
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
A
 
i
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
4
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
.
S
R
:
 
S
e
l
f
-
r
e
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
o
w
n
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
;
 
C
H
S
R
:
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
l
f
-
r
e
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
.
N
o
t
e
:
 
G
L
S
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
i
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
(
c
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
s
)
.
 
T
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
;
 
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
;
’
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
9
0
 
t
o
 
9
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
T
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
s
h
o
w
n
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
s
 
1
 
a
n
d
 
2
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
s
u
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
d
a
t
a
:
 
I
F
D
A
 
c
o
u
l
d
 
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
K
o
r
e
a
;
 
C
H
U
E
R
 
i
s
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
;
 
S
R
 
a
n
d
 
C
H
S
R
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
.
2
)
 
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
,
 
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
,
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
,
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
,
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
,
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
,
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
,
 
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
,
 
U
S
A
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
O
w
n
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
F
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
D
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
sT
a
b
l
e
 
5
P
o
o
l
e
d
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
:
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
s
 
a
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
a
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
1
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
E
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
G
K
A
P
(
-
1
)
F
B
G
D
P
G
C
P
I
S
T
D
D
C
C
H
U
E
R
D
E
U
4
D
L
I
I
F
D
A
F
D
L
F
D
M
F
D
H
S
R
C
H
S
R
R
2
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
6
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
:
(
4
a
)
0
,
0
6
3
0
,
1
9
0
,
1
5
-
0
.
4
1
-
0
.
0
9
-
0
.
0
4
0
,
0
4
-
0
.
0
1
0
,
5
6
4
5
,
4
2
4
1
(
4
.
7
5
)
*
(
3
.
7
0
)
*
(
1
.
4
5
)
(
-
4
.
4
5
)
*
(
-
2
.
1
2
)
*
(
-
1
0
.
4
5
)
*
(
3
.
6
0
)
*
(
-
0
.
4
6
)
1
7
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
:
(
4
b
)
0
,
1
7
0
,
1
7
-
0
.
3
4
-
0
,
0
8
-
0
.
0
4
0
,
0
5
0
,
0
5
5
0
,
0
6
0
,
0
5
2
0
,
5
4
3
8
,
7
2
5
5
(
3
.
2
2
)
*
(
1
.
5
8
)
(
-
3
.
4
1
)
*
(
-
2
.
0
4
)
*
(
-
1
0
.
7
8
)
*
(
4
.
0
8
)
*
(
6
.
0
1
)
*
(
7
.
0
3
)
*
(
5
.
7
8
)
*
1
5
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
)
:
(
4
c
)
0
,
1
8
0
,
2
2
-
0
.
4
8
-
0
.
0
5
-
0
.
0
4
0
,
0
4
0
,
0
4
1
0
,
0
4
5
0
,
0
3
1
0
,
3
5
0
,
1
6
0
,
6
1
3
6
,
3
2
2
9
(
3
.
4
5
)
*
(
1
.
9
0
)
’
(
-
5
.
6
0
)
*
(
-
1
.
3
3
)
(
-
1
0
.
4
)
*
(
3
.
3
2
)
*
(
2
.
6
4
)
*
(
2
.
5
0
)
*
(
1
.
6
4
)
(
1
.
5
1
)
(
1
.
6
4
)
2
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
)
:
 
(
4
d
)
0
,
1
5
0
,
0
6
3
-
0
.
0
0
8
0
,
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
4
’
0
,
0
2
7
0
,
0
0
7
0
,
0
4
4
0
,
1
9
0
,
5
1
4
0
,
7
3
0
7
(
3
.
1
2
)
*
(
0
.
6
7
)
(
-
2
.
6
8
)
*
(
0
.
4
2
)
(
-
1
2
.
9
3
)
*
(
2
.
4
7
)
*
(
0
.
3
1
)
(
2
.
9
8
)
*
(
1
.
8
8
)
’
2
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
a
n
d
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
)
:
 
(
4
e
)
0
,
1
3
8
0
,
1
6
-
0
.
0
0
8
0
,
0
0
2
-
0
.
0
4
2
0
,
0
2
4
0
,
0
2
1
0
,
0
2
9
0
,
0
2
1
0
,
0
1
8
0
,
1
9
0
,
5
1
0
3
2
,
9
3
0
7
(
2
.
9
7
)
*
(
1
.
5
6
)
(
-
2
.
6
4
)
*
(
0
.
4
2
)
(
-
1
2
.
9
4
)
*
(
2
.
1
8
)
*
(
1
.
5
7
)
(
1
.
7
7
)
’
(
1
.
2
9
)
(
0
.
8
2
)
(
1
.
8
9
)
’
2
6
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
f
u
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
)
:
(
4
f
)
0
,
4
0
,
1
3
-
0
.
0
1
0
,
0
0
3
0
,
0
1
5
0
,
0
1
4
0
,
0
2
6
0
,
0
2
3
0
,
2
3
1
7
,
6
3
9
0
(
8
.
9
3
)
*
(
1
.
3
7
)
(
-
2
.
8
4
)
*
(
0
.
8
9
)
(
1
.
4
8
)
(
1
.
6
4
)
(
3
.
4
9
)
*
(
3
.
3
4
)
*
9
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
"
l
o
w
"
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
(
G
r
e
e
c
e
,
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
,
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
 
S
p
a
i
n
,
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
,
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
,
 
K
o
r
e
a
,
 
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
,
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
)
:
 
(
4
g
)
0
,
3
0
,
0
0
0
3
-
0
.
0
1
0
,
0
0
4
0
,
0
1
4
0
,
0
2
9
0
,
0
9
8
0
,
2
7
9
,
2
1
3
5
(
3
.
9
2
)
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
(
-
3
.
2
2
)
*
(
1
.
0
7
)
(
0
.
8
5
)
(
1
.
2
3
)
(
4
.
4
3
)
*
1
2
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
2
)
:
(
4
h
)
0
,
1
6
0
,
2
-
0
.
4
5
-
0
.
0
7
-
0
.
0
4
4
0
,
0
4
8
0
,
0
6
1
0
,
0
4
8
0
,
0
1
2
0
,
2
7
0
,
5
8
2
8
,
5
1
8
0
(
2
.
6
4
)
*
(
1
.
6
9
)
’
(
-
3
.
6
1
)
*
(
-
1
.
4
8
)
(
-
1
0
.
0
0
)
*
(
2
.
2
7
)
*
(
2
.
5
2
)
*
(
2
.
0
1
)
*
(
0
.
4
1
)
(
1
.
2
6
)
1
)
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
G
K
A
P
,
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
;
 
s
e
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
4
.
 
F
B
G
D
P
:
 
F
i
s
c
a
l
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
.
 
G
K
A
P
(
-
1
)
:
 
P
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
s
t
o
c
k
l
a
g
g
e
d
 
o
n
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
;
 
G
C
P
I
:
 
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
C
P
I
)
;
 
S
T
D
D
C
:
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
a
g
e
n
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
 
f
o
r
 
o
v
e
r
l
a
p
p
i
n
g
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
s
t
 
4
 
y
e
a
r
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
a
r
e
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
;
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
s
e
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
s
 
3
 
a
n
d
 
4
.
N
o
t
e
:
 
G
L
S
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
i
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
c
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
s
)
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
8
1
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
1
9
9
5
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
s
 
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
4
.
T
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
;
 
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
9
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
;
’
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
9
0
 
t
o
 
9
5
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
2
)
 
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
,
 
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
,
 
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
,
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
,
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
,
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
,
 
N
o
r
w
a
y
,
 
S
w
e
d
e
n
,
 
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
,
 
U
S
A
.
 
(
J
a
p
a
n
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
d
a
t
a
)
.
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
O
w
n
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
.T
a
b
l
e
 
6
P
o
o
l
e
d
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
:
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
1
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
E
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
R
E
S
 
(
-
1
)
U
E
R
 
(
-
1
)
D
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